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## REVIEWS AND NEW BOOKS

### General Works, Theory and Its History

*Sociology in its Psychological Aspects.* By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. (New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1912. Pp. xi, 417.)

This is a good book with a misleading title. It should have been called "The Sociological Interpretation of Psychology." It presents evidence to support certain sociological theses but does not give the elementary facts needed for an unbiased judgment of the value of this evidence. The statements of those in one science about facts in another science are subject to many limitations. It is so easy to pick out what is favorable and to neglect other interpretations that great care is needed to prevent one-sided conclusions. Such care our author has not taken. It is hard to determine whether he has erred because of carelessness or dogmatism. He is careless if he failed to read widely before writing; he is dogmatic if with the full evidence before him he wrote as he did. The real issue is whether a sociological or an economic interpretation of psychology has the greater value, and yet the author does not seem to know that for two centuries economists have been striving to interpret psychic phenomena in harmony with economic facts. He apparently thinks that economic interpretation begins and ends with Karl Marx.

All economists and sociologists must know something of psychology and biology. The way, however, in which we come to this knowledge is a matter more of personal than of general interest. What a given sociologist knows about psychology is for him important, as it was important for me to discover what an economist could know about biology. I excuse my excursions in the biological field because at the time I wrote there were no books on biology emphasizing the facts needed by an economist. At present there is hardly a corresponding excuse for sociologists or economists to write books on psychology or biology. In recent years several texts have appeared amply meeting the needs of the student of social science. If a clear statement of the doctrine of evolution is desired, he can find it in Crampton's *The Doctrine of Evolution*; if he wishes correct information about the recent development of psychology, he can read Partridge's *Genetic Philosophy of Education*.

The tone of the book and the thesis of the author can be seen from the following passage. There are many similar ones showing that his attitude is a conscious one.

It cannot be admitted, however, that we can explain social organization in general, or social progress, in terms of economic development. A theory of progress, for example, in which the sole causes of social progress were found in economic conditions would neglect political, religious, educational and many other conditions. Only a very one-sided theory of society can be built upon such a basis. The sphere of economics is to explain the commercial and industrial activities of man from the standpoint of values and markets, and not to attempt to become a general science dealing with social evolution. This is now recognized by practically all economists of standing, and the only question which remains is whether economics is independent of sociology or whether it rests upon sociology.

If Dr. Ellwood had informed himself about the various economic theories of progress, he would not have made these statements. The probability is that he has read only the misleading statements in Professor Seligman's *Economic Interpretation of History*. Economists do not say that the causes of progress are in economic conditions, but that economic conditions give a measure of progress. By watching the changes that take place in the various activities of a nation, the observer can determine objectively the condition of the nation in a more accurate way than he can by any other known measure. The real issue is not whether economics precedes or follows sociology, or whether it is a part of or independent from it, but whether a given view of social progress is correct or incorrect. Each thinker has definite propositions which he believes can be proved, and he goes to the same field as his opponent for his proof.

To make this point clear, I shall state the order of progress as I understand it. Biology teaches us that the structures of organisms are difficult to alter. There is no valid evidence showing that the bodily (or nervous) structure of man has altered during the last five thousand years; if so, the source of progress must lie somewhere else than in organic change. The environment, however, is readily modified and in this way a measure of progress is secured. The earliest definite measures of environmental changes are the permanent improvements we call wealth. In contrast with this, the emotions of human beings are the hardest elements to alter and therefore give the least evidence of the changes we call progress. The next test of change is bodily function, and here

we find certain alterations slowly taking place that adjust men in their environment. Language is more flexible than function and its changes represent progress in adjustment more accurately than do changes in function. The fourth test is thought changes which are increasingly mobile, but still slow and indefinite. The fifth is wealth; the sixth is social surplus; the seventh is health; the eighth is culture; the ninth is the social sentiments. If the measures of progress are put in this order, the increasing mobility of the later ones becomes manifest and from them increasingly definite measures of progress are obtained. The psychological tests are not of much consequence because the emotions, while of supreme importance, are unchanged and do not therefore afford measures of progress. We get more objective measures as we pass along the series from structure through wealth to the social sentiments. The student should not, however, accept any one test as final, but getting evidence of progress in one field should check it up in other fields.

The economist prefers evidence that can be readily measured. This does not mean that he is a materialist, but that evidence objectively tested is better than indefinite measurements of psychic structure. All science tends to pass from the more indefinite but subjective facts to those objective enough to be measurable. An illustration of this is given by our judgments of the weather. The earlier man judged whether or not it would rain by the color of the setting sun or by the rings around the moon. To change from such evidence to the reports of the Weather Bureau indicates not a disregard of the aesthetic value of the color of the setting sun but an increasing regard for the next day's activity. The ring around the moon and a weather bureau report are simply two kinds of evidence brought to bear on a common end.

I am stating these facts not to discredit the work of Dr. Ellwood, but to contrast economic and sociological thought. The difference is not between a broader and a narrower science, but between definite propositions in a common field. Progress either comes through race struggle or it comes through coöperation. Whether the emotions or wealth give a better measure of progress is a question of evidence. Those who believe that wealth gives a better measure do not by that mean that emotions are unimportant; they merely mean that wealth is more objective.

This is the second proposition about which sociologists and economists differ. A third difference is a problem of origin. If

human society had a monistic origin then the pluralistic attitude so often held by economists is wrong. The reverse is true if in the end it should be proved that some type of pluralism is at the basis of human progress. The difference is again one of evidence, and not of the field in which economists and sociologists work. There is but one social science and its field is human progress. Mere existence is a physical fact, the explanation of which belongs to more elementary sciences. Social science is thus the science of human achievement. It is telic not descriptive, dynamic and functional but not structural. All social scientists are therefore in one field and have common data. They differ only as to evidence and methods.

Progress can be measured by organic changes directly seen, or by those reflected in consciousness; it can also be measured by environmental changes to which the name economic is given. Interpretations of progress thus fall under three heads: the biologic interpretation in terms of organic changes; the psychological interpretation in terms of feelings, emotions, and passions; and the economic interpretation in terms of the accumulated effects of objective modifications. The first two of these interpretations are emphasized by sociologists and the last by economists.

The decision to be made is not in relation to the *cause* of progress but as to its *measure*, and in measuring progress the sociologists mistake their opponents. It is not the economists who have proved that organic alterations are hard to make. They would gladly accept the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters if biologic facts permitted. It is the breakdown of this doctrine that has taken the importance from the biologic and psychic interpretations of progress. Doubt has thus been thrown on the proof of structural or emotional changes within the last 5,000 years. There seems to be as much proof of degeneration within this period as of evolution. If this is true, the only measures of progress are objective and economic. Sociologists who want other tests should direct their assaults against biology. Economists would welcome success in this attack, but they should be excused from using up their energies in what seems a hopeless task.

Dr. Ellwood's book cannot be regarded as a final statement of social doctrine. It is, however, one of the best books on sociology that has recently appeared. I regard it as the most important book that has appeared since Ross' *Social Control*. It shows evi-

dence of careful work and of great industry. Dr. Ellwood is the kind of man from whom more is to be expected. A man who states his theses boldly and defends them clearly may be wrong, but failure to him means reorganization of evidence from which new progress will come. I shall look forward with interest to Dr. Ellwood's next book and believe that it will be as much in advance of the present one, as this book is superior to any other he has published.

SIMON N. PATTEN.

*University of Pennsylvania.*

*Cours d'Economie Politique à l'Usage des Etudiants des Facultés et Ecoles de Droit.* Vol. I. *La Production, la Consommation et la Plus Grande Partie de la Répartition.* Vol. II. *La Fin de la Répartition et la Circulation Suivies d'un Appendice sur les Finances Publiques et d'un Appendice sur les Particularités Economiques de l'Egypte.* By GEORGES BLANCHARD. (Paris: Auguste Pédone. Vol. I, 1909; Vol. II, 1912. Pp. vi, 710; 907.)

In general form and method of treatment Professor Blanchard's *Cours* is very similar to the typical French *Manuel d'Economie Politique*. It is based upon the works of Beauregard, Cauwès, Leroy-Beaulieu, Colson, and Gide; and, as one might infer from this list, the prevalent tone is that of French optimistic liberalism, somewhat tempered at points by the criticism of Cauwès and others. German and American writers seem to be little known by the author, but Mill, Jevons, and Marshall are drawn upon. It is a merit of the *Cours* as compared with many French works that some attempt is made to digest the theories of the Austrian school. The author, of course, is opposed to socialism (to which he constantly refers) and to "solidarité."

Among the first general characteristics of the book to impress one are its encyclopedic character and its eclecticism. In its sixteen hundred pages it ranges over the whole field of pure and applied economics, excepting only public finance—and that subject is discussed in an appendix! Were it only indexed or arranged alphabetically, it would serve as a dictionary of political economy; and it would be the better adapted for this use from the fact that it presents a brief statement of rival theories on each point. The encyclopedic character of the book is heightened by its arrangement. The order of topics is modified by the exigen-